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Disaster Preparedness

study
A Report to the Citizens of Jacksonville • Summer 1982

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

i

Is Jacksonville prepared for a man-made or
natural disaster? With the numerous risks of
encountering disaster in Jacksonville due to
its geography, weather patterns, transportation
routes, and mi 1i tary faci 1i ties, how can
disaster preparedness here be improved?
The term "disaster" in this study refers to the
occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or
severe damage, injury, or loss of life and/or
property resulting from any natural or manmade
cause. This includes but is not limited to,
enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile military or paramilitary action, fire, flood,
earthquake, wind storm, wave action, epidemic,
air contamination, blight, drought, infestation,
explosion,
or accident
involving
radiation byproducts. A disaster creates a
situation in which the day-to-day patterns of

life are suddenly disrupted and numbers of
people are plunged into helplessness and
distress.
The scope of the study includes a review and
analysis of:
Past disasters and
future disasters.

the

potential

for

Roles of public and private agencies
responsible for responding to disasters.
Methods for communicating among agencies
and with the population before, during,
and after disasters.
• Preparedness programs in similar cities.

HIGHLIGHTS
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS

MAJOR PROBLEMS
Potential for devastating hurricane with insufficient preparation
. Multiple emergency operating centers which
could result in confusion and an ineffective
response to a major disaster
Limited knowledge about disasters by pub 1i c
and officials
Inadequate communication among all disaster
professionals
Ineffective warning messages
Planning emphasizing nuclear attack rather
than hurricanes
Jacksonville designated as
nuclear attack

target area for

Lack of emphasis on an all-hazards approach
to disaster planning

Provide single Emergency Operating Center
Increase public knowledge through the Civil
Defense Division, Red Cross and National
Weather Service working with the media
Hold regular meetings of the Civil Defense
Planning Council and staff.
• Develop a warning package
Redirect and rename Civil Defense Division
Implement an all-hazards
Disaster Planning

approach

to

FINDINGS
Findings represent the data base of the committee. They are derived from the published materials listed
in the references. facts reported by resource persons or from a consensus of committee understanding as
reported by resource persons.
made military hazards. Because of the unique
character, man-made military hazards, primarily
nuclear war, will be considered separately.

LIMITED DISASTER EXPERIENCE
THE LIMITED NUMBER OF DISASTERS IN JACKSONVILLE
IN RECENT YEARS HAS RESULTED IN AN ILL PREPARED
CITIZENRY. Due to favorable circumstances over
the last few years in Jacksonville, no major
disasters causing great property damage and loss
of life have occurred. The population has grown
and new people have moved to the city resulting
in a substantial number of residents who have
never experienced a disaster. As a result of
this lack of experience and population changes.
many citizens are unprepared.

Natural Hazards

THE MOST DEVASTATING NATURAL HAZARD TO WHICH
JACKSONVILLE IS EXPOSED IS THE HURRICANE. The
most dangerous part of a hurricane in terms of
1i ves 1os t and damage incurred is the surge. a
wall of water formed by wind and pressure during
the hurricane. This wall of water. causing 90%
of the deaths, is far more dangerous than the
wind.

For example, most people in Florida have never
experienced a hurricane. Many who believe they
have experienced a full force hurricane were in
a relatively weak storm or an indirect hit.
People tend to make preparations based on their
personal recollection of past storms.
People
who have experienced a disaster tend to be more
prepared.

An excellent description of the effects of a
hurricane surge is provided by John D. McDonald
in his novel Condominium:
The gpeat suY'ge has built up in the Gulf,
built by the gpeatest ?.tJinds woY'king on the
water' as the shoY'eline shallowed.
It was
like a bY'oad bulge 7Tl)Ving towaY'd the shoY'e.
It had been enhanoed in size by the seiohe
effeot, !&tioh oan ooouro !&ten the proessuroe in
any aroea is so low the the water' is aotuaUy
suoked up to a gpeateY' level, as though a
gigantio soda stroaw had been put to use.
The suY'ge was not in itself a wave.
The
huY'rioane waves roemained, moving at the same
Pate OY" a little fastero than the suY'ge. It
was a blaok blistero a few miles in diameter',
swollen to fifteen feet above the alY'eady
high level of the huroY'ioane tides.

Jacksonville's only experience is from an
indirect hit of hurricane Dora in 1964, a relatively weak storm (Saffir/Simpson category 2).
Some professionals fear that this, coupled with
the near miss of hurricane David in 1979, will
make the people in Jacksonville reluctant to
evacuate low ground for the next hurricane.
Hurricane David passed about 70 miles offshore
and did not affect Jacksonville with any hurricane weather or storm surge.
The public historically exhibited little
interest in learning about disasters in order to
become better prepared. Courses offered through
the City's Civil Defense Division and the
National Weather Service usually have limited
attendance.
Elected officials have received
1i ttl e or no training and have no experience
with a major disaster.

A suY'ge Uke this, though not as laroge oro as
high, had droowned almost fouro hundroed people
in Louisiana in 1957. Othero suY'ges had sent
fifteen feet of water' overo Bimini in 1935
and droowned fouro hundroed in the Florida Keys
in that same yearo.
In Novembero of 1932 a
huroY'ioane suroge droowned twenty-five hundroed
in Santa Crouz del SuP, Cuba.
On Septembero
8, 1900, a huY'rioane tide and sto7'm suY'ge
killed six thousand people in Galveston,

A1though the city has had some experience with
evacuating specific areas threatened by hazardous chemicals and fires, no disaster has had
sufficient magnitude to require the impl ementation of the Jacksonville Disaster Preparedness Ordinance signed February. 1980.

Te:x:as.

The suroge 7Tl)Ved just ahead of the eye and a
little south of it.

HAZARD ANALYSIS

There are three categories of hazards: natural
hazards, man-made nonmilitary hazards and man-

Within historic record, Jacksonville has never
experienced a "great hurricane" (winds of 125+
miles per hour). In fact, written records
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North of the St. Johns River the beach
population must evacuate north on AlA or west on
Heckscher Drive. South of the river the westward evacuation must occur on Atlantic Boulevard
with four lanes; Beach Boulevard, with four
lanes; and J. Turner Butler Boulevard, with a
two lane bridge. Feeder roads to these routes
have a minimum of six feet above mean sea level,
whi 1e the approaches to the bridges offer minimums of seven feet above mean sea level.

dating back to 1886 indicate that only one full
hurricane (75 miles per hour) has hit Jacksonville.
During that same period six tropical
cyclones (40 miles per hour and over), ·which
were usually the results of exiting hurricanes
and near misses from hurricanes, have hit the
city.
Based on these long term trends the probability
of a hurricane occurring in Jacksonville is
about 1% a year (one hurricane every hundred
years).
The theoretical storm surge height
during this one hundred year storm has been
estimated
by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, to be about 10 feet.
Forecasts of storm surge heights from a storm
are more accurate and relevant than forecasts of
the wind.

Once the storm begins, people who have ignored
the evacuation warnings will be cut off from
outside help.
Travel through the storm area
will be impossible due to downed power lines and
trees as well as high water. Even after the
storm, transportation problems can make rescue
efforts and delivery of service impossible.
Other hazards from hurricanes include flying
debris and bui 1 ding damage from the high winds,
tornadoes (which are often formed on the advance
edge of the hurricane) and flooding from heavy
rainfall (even after the storm moves ashore and
loses its hurricane status).

During a larger storm such as Camille in 1969 or
the Florida Keys hurricane of 1935 (both conside red to be the most severe hurricanes
recorded for the U.S.), a wall of water of 16-20
feet can be expected at the beaches. This would
mean water to the ceiling of the second floor of
beach hotels. A storm of this magnitude (Force 5
Saffir/Simpson Scale) can be expected once every
500 years. The Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale
below describes the characteristics associated
with various intensities of hurricanes.

Other Natural Threats

THE REMAINING NATURAL HAZARDS THAT THREATEN
JACKSONVILLE HAVE LESS POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING A
MAJOR DISASTER. These hazards can cause limited
death and destruction but will seldom cause the
type of disaster that involves the disruption of
society for a great number of people.

----~----~--~,--------~------------~

Saffir--Simpson Hurricane Intensity Scale

SCALE NUMBER
(CATEGORY)

WINDS
MPH

1

74-95

2
3
4
5

96-110
111-130
131-155
155

SURGE
FT.
4-5
6-8
9-12
13-18
18

Tornadoes, often occurring in conjunction with
the hurricane, can cause severe damage and
death. The Jacksonville area has an average of
two tornadoes per year with January, February
and March being the most likely months. Over
the last 25 years there have been no deaths
directly related to tornadoes in Jacksonville.
However, tornadoes cause a great deal of damage
with winds of up to 300 mi 1es per hour. These
winds can destroy substantial structures and a
great potential for loss of life exists.

DAMAGE
Minimal
Moderate
Extensive
Extreme
Catastrophic

The National Weather Service gives a maximum of
twelve hours warning before a storm strikes.
During most of this time the sky may be clear
and blue with no hint of the approaching storm.
Some people may be reluctant to evacuate in
these conditions. The time of day is also a
factor in a successful evacuation.
A storm
striking at night, such as Camille did on the
Gulf Coast, allows the people plenty of daylight
hours for evacuation. However, the evacuation
would have to occur during the night if the
storm were expected to strike early in the day.

Flood potential in Jacksonville does not pose a
substantial threat to 1i fe or wide spread property damage in Jacksonville except for the
flooding accompanying a major hurricane.
During the last 25 years there has been no loss
of life due to inland flooding or flash flooding
in Jacksonville.
During a hurricane, depending on the tides, wind
direction, and rainfall, the low-lying areas
along the rivers in Duval County could be
subject to extensive flooding.
In addition,
many of the low-lying areas are subject to a
type of flooding known as "pondi ng" which occurs
when low lying terrain with relatively impervious soil becomes super-saturated and drainage
systems can not carry off the excess water.

In some areas of Florida disaster professionals
fear that the beaches could not be evacuated
before a hurricane strikes because of long
causeways and high population density.
The
people living on the barrier islands of Duval
County have several coastal evacuation routes.
3

not have immediate access to the required specialized equipment for detection.

Additional natural threats to Jacksonville
include
lightning
(often
accompanying
thunderstorms), earthquakes and freezes. None
of these natural hazards has the potential in
Jacksonville for causing any widespread property
damage or loss of life.
However, lightning
kills approximately one person a year in the
Jacksonville area.

Many hazardous materials pose a long term danger
rather than an immediate threat to 1ife. Some
of these materials such as oi 1 containing PCB' s
(a carcinogen) are . being transported to and
stored in Jacksonville for eventual disposal. A
spill of this type of material could cause a
long term health hazard.

Man-made Hazards

Fire is another man-made hazard which could
cause a disaster in Jacksonville, as in any community. Most fires are kept well under control,
but a large scale fire, especially in a highrise building filled with people could cause a
disaster.
Improvements over the years in
building codes have made the new high-rise
buildings very safe, in contrast to older
buildings without sprinklers.
Large forest
fires approaching built-up sections of the city
also have potential for loss of life and major
structural damage.

JACKSONVILLE, LIKE ANY LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA,
HAS A VARIETY OF ACTIVITIES AND FEATURES WHICH
HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING A DISASTER. Some
examples of these include the use, storage and
transportation of hazardous and toxic materials;
the movement of trains, aircraft or other
vehicles that could wreck; and the possibility
of a variety of fires.
Hazardous materia 1s are transported through and
used daily in Jacksonville. There are over 1,700
items classified as hazardous materials and
regula ted by agencies such as the Department of
Transportation and the Environmental Protection
Agency. However, the amount and type of hazardous
material
being
transported
through
Jacksonville on a given day are not known.
Vehicles are required to be marked only if they
carry over a certain amount of hazardous
material leaving the remainder to travel without
visible identification.

SIMILARITIES OF DISASTERS
ALTHOUGH EVERY DISASTER IS UNIQUE IN A NUMBER OF
WAYS, EACH CAN BE DESCRIBED BY A LIMITED SET OF
DIMENSIONS AND EACH WILL HAVE SIMILAR EFFECTS ON
THE PEOPLE. These dimensions and effects wi 11
determine which officials and agencies have the
authority and responsibility to act.

Approximately 15% of all trucks passing through
Jacksonville are carrying some type of hazardous materials. There are no controls on the
routes taken by vehicles transporting hazardous
materials through Jacksonville, so dangerous
materials can be transported directly through
town rather than taking routes through less
urbanized areas.
Many of the trains passing
through the city also carry these cargos. The
port handles two hazardous materials in large
amounts: phosphoric or super phosphoric acid,
and refined bulk liquid petroleum products.

A significant number of variables can be
combined to describe a disaster and its effects.
Each variable has implications for mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery activities.
The following table was adapted from an Ohio
State University Disaster Research Center
report. Any disaster can be described by this
set of variables.
DIMENSIONS OF A DISASTER

Most industries located in Jacksonville, as in
other cities, use some type of hazardous
material (some type of flammable material is
most common). A fire or transportation accident
involving hazardous materials has potential for
causing widespread death and destruction.
The most common hazardous material accidents are
The professionals charged with
oil spills.
responding to hazardous materials accidents primarily staff from the Coast Guard, Fire
Department,
Office of the Sheriff and
Bio-Environmental Services Division, are well
prepared for oil spills.
However, accidents
involving some other materials could cause
An improperly marked or unmarked
problems.
material may be difficult to identify as the
city Bio-Environmental Services Division does

1.

Rate: frequency of occurrence
a. has never happened before
b. happens frequently
c. happens infrequently

2.

Physical characteristics
a. wind, rain, etc. (climatic)
b. heat (fire), cold (weather)
c. silent

3. Speed of onset
a. rapid - avalanche, explosion
b. gradual - some floods, famine,
drought, hurricane
c. repetitive - some earthquakes
4
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4.

Length of forewarning (difference from
onset)
a. short - bomb attack, explosion
b. medium - hurricane
c. long - pollution buildup in food chain

5.

Duration
a. short - explosion, etc.
b. medium - flood, some pollution
c. long - famine, pollution

6.

Scope of Impact
a. one house, neighborhood
b. town, stadium
c. bio-region, nation

7.

Destructive potential
a. high property damage, low life-risk
(fire slow in spreading)
b. high life-risk, no property loss
(chemical leak, air pollution
radioactivity)
c. variable - both a+ b

DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PLANNING
MANY CIVIL DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS RESIST THE
NEWER,
MORE
PRACTICAL
AND
ECONOMICALLY
JUSTIFIABLE "ALL HAZARDS" APPROACH TO DISASTER
PLANNING. These professionals favor the more
traditional approach, stressing nuclear attack
These two different philosophies
planning.
determine how local civil defense directors
approach disaster planning.
The philosophy of those favoring the traditional
Civil Defense approach is that by planning for
the ultimate (nuclear) disaster the city will be
prepared and able to respond to any smaller more
local or regional disaster (such as a
hurricane). These professionals prefer to place
emphasis on planning and preparation for nuclear
disasters, believing that these plans will cover
any of the smaller disasters.
The other basic philosophy of disaster planning
states that we should work from the ground up
on smaller more likely disasters and assumes
that the nuclear disaster would be covered by
these plans.
This all hazards approach to
emergency management has been used because of
financial constraints by the state and some
local governments for a number of years. Only
recently have the Federal guidelines been
changed to allow an all hazards approach.

8. Gross Predictability
a. danger area can be predicted with
some accuracy but not necessarily
with a lot of time of forewarning
(e.g., flood, hurricane,"down-wind
accidents like chemical releases)
b. no predictability - no forewarning
(terrorism, auto accidents, "freak
accidents")
c. some forewarning, but no predictability (tornadoes, disease spread)
9.

Federal legislation during the Cold War era
initiated civil defense programs in 1951. The
purpose of the legislation was to provide a
local mechanism to assist the population during
a nuclear war. The Federal government provided
monies for this nuclear civil defense with
requirements for surveying fallout shelters,
stocking them with supplies and radiological
instruments and training peop 1e to cope with a
nuclear attack. During these earlier days,

Gross controllability
(varies with speed of onset, nature,
amount of warning, all of above)

All disasters have similar effects on the
people, places and things as summarized below
on a table from the State Bureau of Disaster
Preparedness.

SUMMARY OF EFFECTS

Places

People
MENTAL

PHYSICAL

ATTITUDE

Disoriented, Confused
Angry
Frustrated
Anxious, Concerned
Frightened
Upset, Nervous
Die
Injured, Sick
Wounded
Incapacitated
Exhausted
Positive/Negative

Destroyed
Damaged
Use Limited
Useless
Contaminated

Things
Lost
Damaged
Destroyed
Use Limited
Useless
Value Reduced
Value Lost

Effects upon places and things sometimes increases the hazard and the effects upon people
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Most
traditional
disaster
planning
has
emphasized the preparedness, response and
recovery phases of a disaster. These phases are
the more action oriented while mitigation is
newer and more regulatory. Mitigation, because
it is newer was selected for more detailed
analysis.

peaking with the Cuban missle cr1s1s in 1964,
civil defense was well funded and directed
solely at the threat of war.
The Federal government is the major funding
source for all disaster preparedness activities.
In the past its guidelines, which
stressed civil defense, caused state and local
governments to shield their all hazards approach
under the umbrella of nuclear planning. Now,
with recent amendments to the Civil Defense Act,
Federal monies can legitimately be used for a
comprehensive, all hazards approach to emergency
management.

MITIGATION
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MADE MITIGATION A
CONDITION OF DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE, CAUSING
A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN MITIGATION INTEREST AT
THE STATE LEVEL. HOWEVER, LITTLE EMPHASIS IS
PLACED ON MITIGATION LOCALLY.

The Florida legislature passed the State
Disaster Preparedness Act in 1974, shifting the
emphasis and requirements of civil defense activities to an all hazards approach called
Comprehensive Emergency Management (C.E.M.).
Many civil defense directors who were firmly
entrenched in the more traditional civil defense
activities were not enthusiastic about this new
strategy.

Hazard mitigation activities are oriented toward
long term prevention or reduction of a disaster
resulting from natural or man-made emergencies.
The Federal
government holds the state
res pons ib 1e
for
mi ti gat ion
activities.
However, most authority needed to mitigate
disaster is not at the state level but at the
1 ocal level.

Comprehensive Emergency Management requires the
development of some type of system to prevent,
mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover
from any natural or man-made hazard or hostile
military action (including nuclear attack) which
could result in damage, injury or loss of life
and property. CEM divides the activities into
four phases:
prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

Hazard mitigation can be viewed as long range
p1anni ng to prevent persons and property from
becoming vulnerable to the hazard in the first
place.
The local government can incorporate
mitigation
efforts
in its comprehensive
planning program and implement it through local
tools such as:

Prevention/mitigation encompasses those activities which actually reduce the probability
of a disaster's occurrence: examples might
include hurricane-resistant requirements in
the building code, a coastal construction
setback line or a flood relocation program.

building codes
zoning regulations
subdivision regulations
plan unit development requirements
public facility locations
coastal construction control lines (the
state may implement these where the
local government does not)
open space controls
preferential taxation
transfer of development rights
public acquisitions
relocation of existing structures
sand dune regulations
septic tank regulations
dispersing public information about hazards

Preparedness activities include those actions
which are necessary to the extent that mitigation measures have not, or cannot prevent
disaster; examples include evacuation planning,
installation of warning systems, and the formulation of intergovernmental and mutual aid
agreements.
Response activities occur during and after an
emergency and are designed to provide emergency
assistance to people affected or threatened.
Examples
include
evacuation,
sheltering,
emergency flood protection, and medical care.

While many local governments in Florida have
bui 1 ding codes which take into account the
forces generated by high waters and hurricane
waves, Jacksonvi 11 e does not have these provisions in its building code.
The City of
Jacksonville is the only coastal area in Florida
which uses the National Building Code, one of
three standard codes suggested for adoption by
local governments. The National Building Code
does not address the different hazards such as
forces generated by high velocity water faced in

Recovery activities follow response and continue
until the population returns to a predisaster
condition. Examples include the provision of
housing for disaster victims and debris removal.
Over a longer term, recovery activities include
building replacement and reconstruction.
6
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Materials Team. During this ongoing series of
meetings, staff from the Fire Division,
Sheriff's Office, Bio-Environmental Services
Division, U. S. Coast Guard, Red Cross, Civil
Defense, and others have analyzed past responses
and developed a specific standard operating procedure outlining the responsibility of each
agency to insure safe and professional action in
hazardous materials incidents.

coastal areas. Jacksonville's code calls for
minimum designs (about 100 mph) which might not
withstand a hurricane's winds and wave action.
The codes used in most other Florida co as ta1
cities call for designs to withstand 120 mph
winds and studies on the subject ca 11 for 140
mph protection.
Although Jacksonville has a flood plain
ordinance required t? qualify for the Federal
government's flood 1nsurance program, little
emphasis is placed on local hazard mitigation
activities.

In other areas of disaster response such as
emergency communication, there is no ongoing
committee to coordinate the emergency response
and anticipate any problems.

COMMUNICATION

Warnings

COMMUNICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, YET IT IS
OFTEN THE LEAST COORDINATED AND PREPARED.
Communications may be divided into three parts.
The first, occurring before a disaster is
anticipated, is the day-to-day meetings and
telephone conversations among agencies in preparation and planning for a disaster. A second
type, warnings, is directed at the general
public from the responsible agencies. The final
type of communications occurs among agencies and
their staffs during the response and recovery
stage.

An effective warning system should consist of
First, some individual or
several stages.
agency must determine the need to give a
warning. Next, the warning must be disseminated
by radio or television, warning devices (sirens,
lights, etc.) or interpersonal interaction.
Finally, the public must respond to the warning.
Depending on the the type of threat, the
warning can originate from a variety of
agencies such as the weather serv1 ce, the
police department, civil defense, or individduals. These have a variety of mechanisms for
obtaining information about the environment.
An information network consisting of various
types of radio, teletype, telephones and
di vi dual observation or experience is used to
One example, the
obtain this information.
National Warning System (NAWAS), is a dedicated
phone line connecting a national network of
disaster-responding agencies.
NAWAS would be
used to forecast a nuclear threat or for
weather warnings.

Inter-agency Communication: Pre- DIsaster

Communications among agencies prior to a
disaster is an important aspect of preparing
for an adequate response by a multitude of agencies during the disaster. Their communications
are essential to keep disaster plans up-to-date
with information such as correct names
telephone numbers, site locations and respon:
sibilities of individuals.
During a multiagency response to any disaster situation, a
much greater degree of cooperation and mutual
understanding. will occur if those responding
have met prev1ously and discussed, clarified and
agreed upon their various responsibilities.

The passing of the warning to those individuals
or groups who need to be informed, called the
dissemination stage, uses commercial radio and
television, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) weather radio, Muzak, and
person-to-person interaction. The sirens previously used in Jacksonville were eliminated due
to their age, the cost of maintaining them and
the limited area they covered.

In Jacksonville, there is a great deal of
ongoing communication and coordination among
most of the agencies with primary disaster
response functions. Under the auspices of the
Department of Public Safety a series of meetings
has been held to develop standard operating procedures. These ongoing meetings, attended by
those who will actually be responding can serve
to anticipate problems and work out solutions
prior to a disaster.

According to a recent research paper which
reviewed literature on warnings, most people
will seek verification from a credible source
before responding to a warning. Most warning
recipients will tend not to act until a message
from one source is confirmed by two other
sources.
Most peop 1e will not respond to a
warning unless it meets certain criteria. An
effective warning message should:

The most notable example of this type of
communication is evident from the activities of
the Department of Public Safety's Hazardous

contain authority figures of three kinds
(political, technical, uniformed).
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Panic is extremely rare in disasters. Research
indicates that panic will not occur unless there
is a perceived threat, partial entrapment, part i a1 break down of escape routes and communication failure. The fear of creating panic
may cause officials to delay giving warnings.
However, a well prepared, early warning will
prevent the preconditions of panic from forming.

have all warning figures in agreement.
go to the home, church, or other areas where
families gather rather than the work place.
appeal to families, since decision-makers
wi 11 act more quickly to protect 1oved ones
who depend on them rather than to protect
themselves.
contain an individually implementable action
that will help the recipient to cope. The
listeners will not retain the warning unless
they feel empowered by the message.

Inter-agency Communication:

Post Disaster

The final type of communication of major concern
during a disaster is that among the responsible
agencies during the response and recovery
phases.
A variety of radio frequencies
are
used by agencies who must work together in responding to a disaster.

In Jacksonville, the warnings for most disasters
should be issued through the the media vi a the
Emergency Broadcasting System, through Muzak and
through the NOAA weather service radio broadcasts. The natural disaster plans call for the
announcements to be made by the Ci vi 1 Defense
Director. The warnings are not packaged in any
special way to encourage the greatest response
by the recipients. An increasing percentage of
the local population is made up of one and two
person households who are least 1ikely to heed
warnings.

After the Hurricane David experience in 1979
re-emphasized to local officials the need for
effective communications, a system of dedicated
phone 1i nes with back up radio capabi 1 i ty was
installed to provide communication among the
following groups during a disaster:
Mayor's Office
Civil Defense
Public Works
Red Cross
School Board
Sheriff/Fire
Jacksonville Electric Authority
Jacksonville Transportation Authority
Navy
Urban Service Districts
Baldwin
Atlantic Beach
Neptune Beach
Jacksonville Beach

An apparent conflict in warning information can
occur during hurricane reports. When a hurricane
is offshore and moving towards land the position
of the storm reported by the private weather
services of the television stations may be in
conflict with the official statement of the
National Weather Service. The National Weather
Service updates the position of the huricane by
reports every two hours (in the future this will
be done every hour) from the National Hurricane
Center in Miami.
During the intervening time
the storm may be moving and its position is
being continually tracked by numerous private
weather radars of the television stations.
Thus, the reports will often give what appears
to be contradictory information.

The Office of the Sheriff and the Fire
Protection Division share the most sophisticated
communications system in the county.
This
system might be impaired in an extreme emergency

TYPES OF DISASTER COMMUNICATION
Inter-Agency
Pre-Disaster
. During Preparedness

Warning
. Directed to

Inter-Agency
Post-Disaster
. Among all agencies

Stage

General Public

and decision makers

. Planning

. Should contain

. During Response and

. Among Staff

specific elements
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Recovery stages

situation, but it is flexible enough to continue
some communications during a disaster.

Office in City Hall, the Civil Defense Office on
Market Street and the Police Memorial Building.

Other
agencies
with
internal
radio
communications that would be used during a
disaster include some divisions of the Public
Works Department, the Jacksonville Electric
Authority,
the Jacksonville Transportation
Authority, and the hospitals (through the
Emergency Medical Radio System). Communications
of these agencies can be coordinated at the command level. However, it is not possible for
many of them to communicate among individuals
working in the field.
Some resource persQns
stated that this field communication was needed
but most said that it would cause undue expense
and confusion and that the system required 'communication only at the command level.

The Civil Defense Emergency Operating Center
uses an old building predating the 1901
Jacksonville fire.
Civil Defense facilities
occupy the second floor with offices of the
other Public Safety Divisions in the remainder
The roof of this building
of the building.
holds an array of rusty old antennas which do
not appear to be prepared to withstand any wind.
In addition, the windows in the EOC do not have
adequate protection. Though the Civil Defense
D.i vision has worked to make this building into
an effective EOC, funds have not been available
to do an adequate job. In a major disaster,
plans call for the building to house 120 people
and serve as the central location for coordination and control of all disaster response
activities.

Additional disaster communication capability
exists through the mi 1i tary, the American
Radio Relay League (HAM) operators and the
telephone company. The volunteer HAM operators
are relied upon to provide emergency communications among some agencies during a
disaster.
The American Red Cross and the
American Radio Relay League have organized to
provide communications among the National
Weather Service, Civil Defense, and the American
Red Cross shelters. They also have a long range
system to communicate messages to relatives in
other areas when standard communications are
not avail ab 1e. Southern Be 11 has designed its
system to withstand most disaster situations.
Even when the system is damaged it has the capability and plans for installing limited
emergency
communications
immediately
and
restoring telephone communication in a short
time following a disaster.

In 1979 when hurricane David threatened to
strike Jacksonville, the Mayor established and
operated from an emergency communications center
in his 14th floor office in City Hall. Though
the need for coordination and communication
during hurricane David made the City Hall location appropriate, it may not be appropriate for
The wind broke windows in
future disasters.
some high-rise buildings during Hurricane
Frederic in. Mobile, in 1979, and caused the
interior walls to collapse. Also, the ground
floor of City Hall may be flooded during a storm
cutting off this facility.
There is a modern EOC located at the Police
Memorial Building adjacent to the room containing the main communications center used
regularly for police and fire communications.
This center has most of the facilities (radio
and phone) of the Civil Defense Center with the
addition of a more modern and versatile communications system. During a disaster a command
1evel officer wi 11 be sent to Civi 1 Defense to
coordinate with other organizations, and not
duplicate the center.

The complexities of the emergency communications system during the response and recovery
phase of a disaster make it extremely difficult
to evaluate. Because of the continual updating
and changing of communications capabilities,
there is presently no written plan outlining
the various frequencies and responsibilities
for communication.
In addition, there is no
ongoing committee to coordinate emergency communications among all of the private and public
agencies.

The Civil Defense Director from Harrison County,
Mississippi, who has extensive experience in
disasters
including
the
super-hurricane,
Camille, in 1969, maintains that Jacksonville's
Civil Defense EOC is inadequate. He said that
one location for all the required decision makers with the tools necessary to get the job
done is essential for a good coordinated
response to a disaster.

EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT AMONG DISASTER
PROFESSIONALS HERE AND IN OTHER COMMUNITIES THAT
A CENTRAL EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER WHICH
HOUSES ALL DECISION AND POLICY MAKERS, AND
COMMUNICATIONS IN ONE LOCATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR
GOOD DISASTER MANAGEMENT. However, there are
presently three Emergency Operating Centers
(EOC) in the following locations: the Mayor's

LEARNING FROM A DISASTER
DISASTERS
IN OTHER AREAS WITH SIMILAR
CHARACTERISTICS TO JACKSONVILLE CAN SUPPLY
VALUABLE INFORMATION ON WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A
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tection of the civilian population during a
nuclear attack (nuclear civil protection planning) is the backbone of civil defense activity and comes from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. This Civil Defense planning
is based on the assumption that the United
States cannot protect the majority of the urban
population from nuclear blasts, making evacuation into rural areas (where fallout protection can be provided) imperative.
This
protection will be provided by expedient
shelters (basically holes in the ground with log
and dirt covers).

MAJOR DISASTER. When Hurricane Camille struck
the Mississippi Gulf Coast it left 132 people
dead and destruction more comparable to a
nuclear blast than to previously recorded
storms.
In the. af~ermath of the storm, water, power,
commun1cat1ons, transportation, food distribution and fuel were completely cut off. There
were 33,460 homes with significant damage and
6,820 homes totally destroyed.
Some of the
recovery problems encountered and recommended
solutions used in Harrison County, Mississippi
are outlined below:

These plans assume that the United States will
be given advance notice (over three days) of any
nuclear attack. The presumption is made that
the Soviets will evacuate their cities prior to
attacking. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain
that there will be two weeks notice before a
nuclear attack, due to the increase in international tension and this Soviet evacuation
activity. This evacuation plan is labeled crisis relocation planning.

A rumor control center was set up in the
District Attorney's office to check out and
prosecute anyone engaging in price gouging,
looting, or hoarding emergency supplies.
No looting or hoarding cases were confirmed
following the disaster.
The absence of electrical power following
the storm created numerous additional
problems. Without electricity many pumps
could not be operated to provide sewage
disposal, water or fuel. Refrigeration and
ice became scarce. (Ice was critical for
preservation of food and medical supplies).

Duval County is considered to be a target risk
area in the event of an attack. As they live in
a target area, the population would be expected
to move out of the city into 12 neighboring
counties which are not considered to be targets.
These rural counties surrounding Jacksonville do
not have enough shelter for their own popul ation, much less for the Duval population.
Statewide, this evacuation policy calls for
removing approximately 5.5 million of the
state's 7.5 million population from the cities
to areas without shelter or any system for
supplying basic living necessities.

Several of the hospitals were unable to
function.
Hospitals in low lying areas
were also rendered useless in severe
flooding by limited access and destruction
of auxiliary power. Lack of power to pump
sewage can also force the shutdown of some
hospitals.
The most critical need, as previously
mentioned, was for one central EOC to guide
A complex management
recovery efforts.
system to distribute food, water and medical supplies and coordinate recovery must
be deve1oped.

Local, regional and state civil defense
personnel all indicated a skepticism about the
viability of this crisis relocation planning.
The relocation alternative was probably chosen
because it costs less than any other nuclear
civil defense alternative .

rigid public release policy by the chief
executive is needed to eliminate conflicts
in press releases.

.A.

A second type of nuclear civil defense calls for
sheltering the population locally. This method
was the favored national policy when civil
defense funding was higher back in the 60's.
The buildings in Jacksonville were surveyed by
the Corps of Engineers to determine their suitability as fallout shelters.
At the time, many
of these shelters were stocked with provisions
and marked with signs.

The distribution of goods by charitable
organizations
was
not
coordinated,
causing inequities in the amounts some
people received.
This essential service
was very welcomed but could have been
better organized.

It is now commonly acknowleged that economically
feasible shelters cannot provide protection
against the blast, heat, intense radiation, and
mass fires that would probably occur in densely
populated regions.
Shelters could save lives
only in places that were subject to nothing more
than modest amounts of fa 11 out.
Those in a
target area when a bomb is detonated will not

NUCLEAR WAR
PLANS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE URBAN POPULATION
IN A TARGET AREA DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK ARE
DEEMED UNREALISTIC EVEN BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DISASTER PLANNING.
Policy-making for the pro-
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Over the years there has been a lack of
continuity in Federal disaster programs and
policies. The Federal agency responsible for
disaster planning changed its name eight different times in recent years due to changes in
legislation and administration.

survive the blast. This does not mean that a
nuclear war is not survivable, but that it is
not survivable in a densely populated area that
is attacked.
The rate of
with their
all hazards
methods to
respond to
area.

survival of the population increases
distance from the blast site. The
approach to disaster planning offers
reduce the population 1oss and
the disaster outside this impact

FEMA is not a first responder during a disaster
because the only resources immediately available
to a local community during a disaster are those
1ocated within the community. FEMA' s resources
can be brought to the disaster site to help the
1ocal government only after the disaster has
ended.

PREPAREDNESS ORGANIZATIONS

FEMA works with states in developing operating
plans for most emergency contingencies. It conducts training programs in each state and assist
the state in developing disaster plans.
After
the disaster, FEMA staff can be used to assist
in preparing the damage assessment necessary
before Presidential assistance is requested.
Every Federal agency and substantial Federal
funds are at the President's disposal to assist
in the recovery efforts if an area is declared
a disaster by Presidential Proclamation.

ALMOST ALL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES (FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL) AS WELL AS AUTHORITIES,
UTILITIES AND MANY PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ARE
INVOLVED
IN
SOME
ASPECT
OF
DISASTER
PREPAREDNESS. In a major disaster everyone in
the community may be affected directly or
indirectly.
All local resources as well as
numerous resources from outside the area may be
required.
The organizations which have the
res pons i bi 1i ty for disaster management have the
tasks of:

The procedure for declaring a disaster begins
with the local government using or committing
all of its resources and calling the governor
for assistance. Once the local government and
the state government have committed (not used)
all of their resources, the governor prepares a
request for Federal assistance. The request,
i ncl udi ng a damage assessment justified by FEMA
employees, is sent to the President. After the
President proclaims the disaster, a wide variety
of programs become av a i 1ab 1e to i ndi vi dua1s in
the area.

minimizing any negative effects
• coping with negative effects during and
immediately following a disaster,

'·"

• working to coordinate response and recovery
These agencies plan, prepare for and provide
a variety of services to disaster victims.
Services include:

There are 32 hazard mitigation programs of the
Federal government that provide assistance,
direct construction aid, training or grants to
the state, regional and local agencies. These
hazard mitigation efforts are aimed at reducing
property damage and loss of life from both manmade and natural disasters vi a everyday decisions including land use planning, coastal zone
protection and other long term development regulations. Federal programs for disaster mitigation are available from:

Evacuation
Protection
Shelter
Medical Care
Food
Clothing
Damage Repair
Financial Assistance
Debris clean-up

'

Federal

U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of Transportation
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency

The Federal Emergency Management Agency ( FEMA)
is an independent agency of the Federal
Government whose director is appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. FEMA was
organized in 1979 to consolidate the several
Federal level agencies with disaster preparedness, hazard mitigation, emergency response and
disaster recovery responsibilities. It combined
those agencies with responsibilities for Civil
Defense as well as peacetime disasters.
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provide assistance to Jacksonville in a recovery
operation except with Federal funds.

FEMA is the primary funding source for state and
local disaster related activities. Some FEMA
funds can be released only by Presidential
proclamation, while others are disbursed yearly
to the states and local government for disaster
preparation.

The Federal government requires that the state
and local governments pay 25% of all eligible
recovery costs with the Federal government
p~ing 75%.
The reconstruction following a
disaster might not be completed due to the inability of the local and state governments to
furnish the required 25%.

State

The responsibility for disaster preparedness for
the State of Florida 1 i es with the Bureau of
Disaster Preparedness in the Division of Public
Safety, Planning and Assistance in the Department of Veteran and Community Affairs.
The
emergency management programs of the State of
Florida exist to deal with any threat for which
there is not an existing permanent structure to
maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the
population.
Because of this, state disaster
responsibilities range from the contamination of
water and the Cuban refugee crisis to historical
responsibilities such as hurricanes and nuclear
attacks.

The
Florida
legislature
is
consider'ing
legislation for a State Disaster Relief Trust
Fund to make this matching money available. The
state would provide half and the local government would provide half.
If necessary, the
state would loan the local government the money
for the local share. The legislation calls for
an initial trust fund of $10 million dollars
enough to cover most disasters but not enough
to cover a major hurricane striking a large
city.
Legislation providing for disaster preparedness
activities in the State of Florida created the
Bureau of Disaster Preparedness, and authorized
the creation of local organizations for disaster
preparedness. It conferred emergency powers on
the governor and local officials, provided -for
mutual aid agreements and set up the purposes
and means by which disaster preparedness activites could be accomplished.

The Federal government holds the state responsiThe state
ble for mitigation activities.
disaster mitigation responsibility includes:
• Providing technical assistance to local
governments
Developing general mitigation policy
guidelines
• Bringing those po11 ci es in 11 ne with the
actual hazards in areas where the state
has
responsibilities
(i.e.
coastal
construction control lines)

Local

The Civil Defense Division of the Public Safety
Department of the City of Jacksonville is
charged with disaster mitigation, preparedness,
Its
response, and recovery responsibilities.
primary purpose is to coordinate the plans and
regulations of the Federal and state and other
local disaster preparedness agencies.

The state preparedness responsibilities include
establishing standards for local programs and
preparing state plans designed to provide
intergovernmental coordination.
During the
response phase of a disaster, the state provides
assistance at the request of the local government. However, if a disaster occurs with an
overriding public safety issue requiring the
immediate response of both the state and local
resources, the governor has the authority and
the responsibility to intervene.

A 1oca1 ordinance es tab 1 i shed the Civi 1 Defense
Planning Counci 1 to coordinate and direct the
disaster preparedness activities of all agencies
in the city. This planning council consists of:
• The Mayor as Chairman
Director of Department of Public Safety,
City of Jacksonville as Vice-Chairman
Director of Department of Health,
Welfare, and Bio-Environmental
Services
Director of Department of Public Works,
City of Jacksonville
Sheriff
Chief Judge of the IV Judicial Circuit
Chairman of Jacksonville Electric Authority
• Chairman of Duval County Hospital Authority
• Chairman of the Jacksonville Port Authority
• Chairman of the Jacksonville Transportation
Authority
Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station
J acksonvi 11 e

When the state goes into the comprehensive
emergency management mode, the governor has the
authority to call on all state agencies to provide assistance.
Historically, the governor
does not make a local disaster decision (such as
an evacuation) without consulting the local
chief elected official (in Jacksonville this is
the Mayor).
Recovery after the disaster is probably the
weakest part of the state program. Florida law
states that funds shall always be available for
However, there is little money
recovery.
available from the state for disaster recovery.
There is no effective mechanism for the state to
12

Authorities, the Office of the Sheriff, and
other
local
organizations with
disaster
responding roles. Each organization is charged
with de vel oping its annex to the overall plan
and with working on joint plans when required.
The disaster plans are designed to make use of
existing employees in appropriate activities.
The type of disaster determines which organizations are called upon and which one is in
charge.

Commanding Officer, Mayport Naval Station
Commanding Officer, Cecil Field Naval Air
Station
Mayor, Jacksonville Beach
Mayor, Atlantic Beach
Mayor, Neptune Beach
Mayor, Baldwin
Administrator, District IV, Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services
Chapter Manager of American Red Cross
Administrative Supervisor, Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Company
Director of Civil Defense Division,
Department of Public Safety, City of
J acksonvi 11 e

The city's disaster ordinance designates the
mayor as the ultimate authority in the reorganized governmental structure during a disaster.
However, the sheriff does not answer to the
mayor, because he is a constitutional officer of
the State and is responsible to the Governor.
Both the sheriff and mayor are elected officials
answerable
directly
to
the
people.
Nevertheless, in an emergency situation the
mayor's office acts as the major coordinating
body and a command level member of the sheriff's
office is sent as liaison with Civil Defense.

This planning council must recommend to the City
Council a civil defense plan conforming with
state and Federal guidelines and mutual aid
agreements and interjurisdictional agreements
with appropriate agencies. The Planning Council
also conducts a continuing study of the need for
amendments to and improvements in the civil
defense plans.

Private Sector

The American Red Cross is the major private
responder to disasters in Jacksonville.
By
Congressional Charter, the mission of the
American Red Cross in the time of natural
disaster is to provide for needs of the people.
More specifically, the American Red Cross' role
is to provide needy disaster victims with food,
clothes, shelter, and medical care.

The members of the planning council represent
each of the city agencies having responsibilities during a disaster. The type of
disaster and its dimensions determine what role
each agency will play and which agency has primary responsibility for each aspect of the
disaster.
Usually the designated members of
this planning council do not attend its
meetings, but send representatives specialized
in the areas under discussion.

The Jacksonville Area Chapter of the American
Red Cross has a pool of 300 trained volunteers,
and 16 Red Cross professionals. When appropriate
it can seek support from the hierarchy (regional
and national levels) in its organization. The
disaster preparedness team of Red Cross has persons trained as doctors, nurses, heavy equipment
operators, cooks, engineers, clerks, and radio
operators.

The city's disaster ordinance temporarily
modifies the city governmental structure when
the mayor declares a disaster.
The mayor,
assisted by the Director of Public Safety,
controls this organization to execute the civil
defense p1an.
The mayor is the head of the
civil defense organization and is responsible
for the prompt, efficient execution of the civil
defense plan as necessary to:

A primary function of the Red Cross is to
provide shelter for disaster victims. Shelter
facilities consist chiefly of public schools
scattered in convenient 1ocati ons. Agreements
with the School Board make these immediately
available in the event of a disaster. The Red
Cross also has secured the promise of shelter
facilities in church buildings, clubs and hotels
in the event of a greater need. Other Red Cross
disaster activities include:

• Reduce the vulnerability of the people and
the city to damage, injury and a 1os s
of life and property.
• Prepare for and execute rescue, care and
treatment of persons victimized or
threatened by disaster.

• Assessing damage

• Provide a setting conducive to the rapid
and orderly start of restoration and
rehabi 1i tat ion of persons and property
affected by a disaster.
The Civil Defense Division
disaster plans of the city's

• Acquiring food
• Supplementing public and private health
agencies in supplying medical aid and
nursing care

coordinates the
departments, the
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Obtaining and distributing clothing as
needed to disaster sufferers (this function is also performed by the Salvation
Army)

nel and facilities, not for civilians.
The
dependent population is the responsibility of
the local government during a disaster.
When the governor proclaims a state of disaster
emergency, he may call up the National Guard to
respond to the disaster. The 1oca 1 government
may request assistance with communications,
transportation or emergency el ectri city generation from the National Guard •

. Coordinating news releases
Providing communications service
. Providing transportation
Assisting
rescue

in

voluntary

evacuation

In the most severe situation, such as a military
attack, the President can
federalize the
National Guard into the active Army and call on
this Army to respond to local disaster needs.
It is the Army, not the Navy, that is charged
with assisting Civil Defense and local governments in the event of a major disaster. The
First Army, covering the Eastern portion of the
United States, would take charge if called upon
for assistance.
In this extreme situation all
of the resources of all mi 1 i tary branches would
be made available and coordinated through the
Army.

and

Although
the
various public and private
organizations mentioned previously have responsibilities for assisting the public with
disasters, each individual is responsible for
his
own
disaster
and
evacuation
plans.
Exceptions to this include some handicapped and
persons in licensed group care facilities.
Handicapped i ndi vi dua 1 s who responded to a survey mailed out with utility bills will receive
evacuation assistance during a disaster (via JTA
buses) through the Handicap Evac program.
Evacuation plans for group care facilities such
as nursing homes and hospitals are the responsibility of the operators of the facilities.
Individuals living in multi-unit housing (i.e.
high-rise buildings at the beach) that are not
licensed group care facilities are responsible
for their own plans. However, many people are
not aware that this is their responsibility.

If the situation requires it, the President can
declare martial law. Under martial law the military command comes in and takes over the entire
operation of city government including police,
fire, garbage collection, etc. The military are
usually the last to recommend martial law.
Declarations of martial law are rare and most
professionals recommend against them.
The U.S. Coast Guard has a statutory authority
to look after the public health and welfare of
any maritime or marine related problem. The
Coast Guard's regulatory authority over hazardous material in the port serves as a hazard
mitigation activity.
From the Coast Guard's
point of view, the major potential
for a
disaster in Jacksonville is a hurricane.
Its
role prior to a hurricane includes checking all
waterfront faci 1 i ties and vessels to determine
if they might pose a threat and requiring their
removal during a hurricane, as well as the role
of search and rescue.

Military

The extent of military involvement in a local
disaster depends on the dimensions of the
disaster.
Depending on these dimensions, the
Navy, Army, National Guard, and/or Coast Guard
may become involved in civilian operations.
The Navy has a good neighbor policy with local
governments and will attempt to help in any
1ocal emergency requiring its assistance. When
an immediate threat to life exists, the local
Commanding Officer can immediately assist
the City. However, as 1ong as the Navy is not
specifically needed to save lives or property it
is
restricted by
higher directives
from
assisting in civilian disaster.
The primary
disaster plans of the Navy are for Naval person-

Both the Navy and Coast Guard personnel
regularly change duties. This policy prevents
continuity among the staff with disaster responsibilities.
Staff
with
expertise
in
Jacksonville's disaster response system may be
transfered to another city before replacements
can become familiar with local disaster professionals.
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CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions express the value judgment of the committee, based on the findings.
1.

The citizens and officials have limited or
no experience in Jacksonville with major
disasters such as hurricanes and thus are
less prepared than these living in areas
with more frequent disasters.

2.

There is a great need for people to become
educated about the dangers from and preparation needed for disasters. However, people
generally do not pay attention to such
information until a crisis is imminent.

3.

A hurricane is potentially the greatest
natural hazard faced in Jacksonville yet
people do not realize the danger. During
and immediately after a major hurricane the
city could expect:

. Trees, powerlines and other windblown
debris would make most roads impassable
and hinder rescue and restoration
efforts.

Just hours before the storm the weather
may be clear and the wind light.
In a severe hurricane such as Cami 11 e, a
wall of water or storm surge up to 20
feet in height would come ashore capable
of destroying any bui 1dings on the beach
in its path. This surge could pass over
the entire barrier island from the beach
to the Intercoastal Waterway.
Depending on the wind direction, tides
and direction of the hurricane, water
backed up in the rivers and estuaries
could cause extensive inland flooding
covering roads and cutting off many 1ow
lying areas.

4.

Because of the movement of a hurricane between the periodic NOAA weather reports and
the continual tracking of the radar at television stations, apparent contradictions
occur abo• ·t the 1oca t ion of hurricanes from
the local stations and the National Weather
Service.

5.

Routing certain materials around the city
rather than directly through the urbanized
areas would minimize the hazard of a
disastrous accident to population centers.

6.

The professionals charged with responding
to disasters in Jacksonville are
well
organized and appear well prepared to
(fires,
respond to most small incidents
hazardous materials accidents, etc.) which
might threaten the city.

7.

Although many professionals with disaster
responsibilities meet regulary, some do
not. All specialized professionals responsible for disaster response need to have
ongoing meetings with those others who
share responsibility.

8.

More local emphasis on hurricane hazard
mitigation now would save lives and prowhen
a major
storm
strikes
perty
Jacksonville.
A strong building code is
an effective mechanism for local hazard
mitigation. Jacksonville's Building Code
does not require withstanding hurricane
forces as do the codes of other coastal
cities.

9.

An effective system of communications is
required before a disaster is anticipated, during the warning announcement
and during the response and recovery
stages.

A 1arge percentage of the residences at
the beaches would be damaged or
destroyed. All of them could be uninhabitable due to lack of power, water,
sewage disposal.
Electrical power would be disrupted all
over the city. Without this power, pumps
could not operate to provide fuel, water,
or sewage disposal. Refrigeration would
not operate to preserve food and medical
supplies.

Most of the agencies sharing disaster
responsibilities in Jacksonville do not
meet and plan regularly in preparation
In many
for various types of disaster.
areas such as emergency communications
there is no ongoing communication to
coordinate and anticipate problems in
responding to an emergency.

Inland flooding would damage and render
unusable many low lying buildings along
the waterways of the county. This could
mean that several hospitals could not be
used and that access would be cut off
from most governmental offices downtown.
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The method of warning the population and
obtaining the desired response has not
received
adequate
attention
in
Jacksonville. Warnings should contain
specific elements in order to be effective.

12. The ongoing rotation of local Coast Guard
and Navy staff precludes the continuity
needed to adequately coordinate with local
disaster workers.

• Conflicting sources of information in a
warning confuse the public and reduce
the chance of obtaining the desired
response.

13. One coordinated information source and a
rumor control mechanism is needed for a
disaster.

• The lack of interagency coordination has
made the system less effective than it
might be.

14. Currently, there is no adequate protection
from a nuclear attack in an impact area. In
addition, there is no realistic way to evacuate the entire population of Jacksonville
into the surrounding counties as planned.
However, the all hazards approach will
offer plans to respond to a limited nuclear
disaster.
Real protection from nuclear
attack can come only from national and
international policy changes designed to
reduce the threat of nuclear war.

10. Jacksonville does not have a single
adequately equipped and staffed emergency
operating center designed to hold all decision and policy makers and communications
facilities necessary for effective recovery
from a major disaster.
Jacksonville's
Civil Defense Division Emergency Operating
Center is inadequate due to its small size,
poor layout, and physical condition.
11. As the name Civil Defense Division
suggests, the primary emphasis on disaster
planning in Jacksonville is for a nuclear
attack. A more realistic approach would be
to use an all hazards approach and stress
hurricane planning.

15.

Local and state recovery funds required by
FEMA to partially match Federal disaster
assistance are not available. Thus, damage
from a major disaster is unlikely to be
fully restored due to lack of these
matching funds.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations are the committee's specific suggestions for change, based on the findings and concl us ions.
1. The Jacksonville Civil Defense Division
should pro vi de an a11 hazards approach to
disaster planning covering all types of
disasters with emphasis on hurricanes.
The name should be changed to the Jacksonville Emergency Management Division (or
something similar) of the Department of
Public Safety.
2.

overview of the likely disasters faced and
expected effects faced by Jacksonville.
4.

The Civil Defense Division, American Red
Cross,
and
National
Weather Service
should work with the local media to improve the education of the general public
on what to expect from a disaster,
especially a hurricane and how they should
prepare for it. There should be an ongoing
effort to take the message to all segments
of the public.

The Mayor should require a staff level
committee representing each of the members
of the Civil Defense Planning Council to
meet quarterly to coordinate and update
disaster plans and communications.

5. The local news media and National Weather
Service should develop an agreement to pool
information on weather bulletins to aviod
conflicts in warning of the location of
severe weather.
6. The Civil Defense Division should prepare a
specific plan for a more effective warning
package to include specifics of who should
give the warning and its wording.

3. A11 of the designated members of the Ci vi 1
Defense Planning Council should meet at
least once a year for a staff briefing on
the officials' responsibilities, their
location during the disaster, and with whom
they will be directly working, including an

a plan for a
7. The Mayor should develop
single source, rigid public release mechanism to provide a consistent source of
official information during and after a
disaster, including a rumor control mecha-
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10.

nism adequate for the entire population.
8. The Mayor should develop, for the City
Council's approval, regulations with regard
to the routing of hazardous materials
around rather than through the city.
9.

The City's Building and Zoning Division
should examine the local building codes to
see if they are adequate to cover a probable hurricane in the Jacksonville area.
Special emphasis should be placed on
construction in the beach areas.

The Mayor, through the Public Safety
Division and in Cooperation with the Office
of the Sheriff, should recommend to the
City Council the establishment of a single
adequately equipped emergency operating
center designed to hold all decision and
policy makers and communication facilities
during and after a major disaster.

11. The local military should designate a
civilian employee to act as a disaster
liaison to provide continuity with local
disaster agencies.
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Department of Public Safety

ROBERT F. BLODGETT
Director
Civil Defense Division
Department of Public Safety
City of Jacksonville

FRAN KOSTER
President
Koster/Hopkins, Inc.

WALTER BUTLER
Fire Marshall
Department of Public Safety
City of Jacksonville

M. P. RICHARDSON
D1rector
Police Operations
Office of the Sheriff

ATC JOHN CAMPBELL
u.s. Navy

DR. SAM ROWLEY
Director
Division of Public Health
Dept. of Health, Welfare
and Bio-Environmental Services

THOMAS CASTIGLIA, JR.
Chairman
Red Cross Disaster Preparedness

JACK SCHNABEL
Meterologist in Charge
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration

JIM DALZELL
North Florida Area Coordinator
North Florida Area Civil Defense
Starke, Florida

R. E. WEEKS
Director
System Operations
Jacksonville Electric Authority

PHIL EDDINS
Hazardous Materials Team
Department of Public Safety
City of Jacksonville

LT. COMM. DAVID WEIGHTON
Direct Security
NAS Jacksonville

BOB GANTT
Emergency Management Specialist
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Thomasville, Georgia

CHIEF RANDY WHITE
Communication Officer
Office of the Sheriff
BOB WILKERSON
Division Director
Planning and Assistance
Division of Public Safety
Tallahassee, Florida

WADE GUICE
Director
Harrison County Civil Defense
Harrison County, Mississippi

BILLY F. WILLIAMS, JR.
Manager, Section Communition
Amateur Radio Relay League

BYRON HODGES
Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Company

O.A. WILLOCKS
Exeutive Director
Jacksonville Area Chapter
of the American Red Cross

J. D. IGOU
Division Chief
Sanitation Division
Department of Public Works
City of Jacksonville

DON WINSTEAD
Department of Health &Rehabilitative Services

CDR KARL KAESER
U. S. Navy
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THE JACKSONVILLE COMMUNITY COUNCIL, INC.
The JCCI membership now exceeds 500 citizens
representative of all parts of the Jacksonville
community.

The Jacksonville Community Council, Inc. (JCCI)
was formed to anticipate, identify and address
the complex issues of urban life. JCCI is a
community-based nonpartisan, nonprofit organization providing the vehicle for in-depth,
objective, citizen analysis of community
problems and 1ssues. It seeks broader community
awareness and understanding of the issues and
provides Jacksonville a diverse citizen forum
reaching across the traditional dividing lines
of a complex and diverse urban community.

JCCI STUDIES

*Local Government Finance ..•... Robert D. Davis
*Housing

The primary goal of JCCI is a better quality of
life in Jacksonville through positive change.
It has a short but impressive record for the
quality, objectivity, clarity, and practicality
of its studies of community problems, and
its advocacy for the solutions it develops.
Jacksonville has experienced the benefits of
numerous improvements growing from these citizen studies.

....•..•..•..•.•..•.• Thomas Carpenter

*Public Education
(K-12) .•......•.....•.. Robert W. Schellenberg
*Public Authorities .......•.• Howard Greenstein
*Strengthening the Family

Jacquelyn Bates

Capital Improvements
for Recreation .•.........••........ Ted Pappas

Other JCCI goals grow largely from its focus on
positive change. High on the list are the education and dialogue the studies themselves provide to participants. The work of JCCI
strengthens citizen competence and awareness,
provides for ongoing dialogue among diverse elements of the community, and serves as a catalyst
for bringing together decision-makers.

Citizen Participation
in the Schools ...•.......•••••.... Susan Black
Youth Unemployment .•.•.•...•.•... Roy G. Green
Civil Service •••..•.......••.... Max K. Morris
Planning in Local Government • I. M. Sulzbacher

JCCI is founded on a deep faith in the ability
of citizens to set aside their differences and
join together to learn and reason about problems
of mutual concern. Its growth and success offer
renewed hope for this basic democratic concept
as a means of addressing the complex issues of
modern urban communities.

But Not in My Neighborhood •.•.• Pamela Y. Paul
The Energy Efficient City ••. Roderick M. Nicol
Coordination of Human Services ...•• Pat Hannan
Higher Education •..•••.•••.•... R. P. T. Young

JCCI receives funding from the United Way of
Jacksonville, the City of Jacksonville, corporations, and individual
members. Occasional
grants have been obtained for specific projects
or conferences.

*Copies no longer available for distribution

JCCI BOARD OF MANAGERS

JCCI STAFF

MARIAN CHAMBERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Howard Greenstein •....••••...... President
Jacquelyn D. Bates ....••.......• President-Elect
Robert T. Shircliff •••...••••.•. Secretary
David Hicks ••..•..••.••••....... Treasurer
James Borland
Ezekiel Bryant
James Burke
Betty S. Carley
George W. Corrick
Patricia Cowdery
Larcie Davis
George Fisher

CHAIRMAN

PROFESSIONAL:

Anne Mcintosh
"Flo Nell Ozell
Espie Patrinely
Pamela Y. Paul
James Rinaman
Robert Schellenberg
Suzanne Schnabel
Stephen Wise

SUPPORT:
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John L. Hamilton
Frances L. Kling
Annette Brinson
Andrea Greene

.lacbonvllle
Community
Council Inc.
1045 Rlveraide Ave., Suite 180

Jacksonville, Florida 32204
Telephone (904) 358-4136

.
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